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EX POST FACTO IN THE CONSTITUTION

ex post facto clauses of the Constitution
A NYwhichstudydid ofnotthecommence
with a consideration of
v.
1

Calder
Bull2 would not conform to good practice. The text writers and
the commentators uniformly begin their treatment of ex post facto
laws by citing it as the leading case, and setting forth its doctrine.
There is singular agreement as to the correctness of the l)olding of
the case.3 The statement given by Cooley is typical: "At an early
day it was settled by authoritative decision, in opposition to what
might seem the more natural and obvious meaning of the term ex
post facto, that in their scope and purpose these provisions were
confined to laws respecting criminal punishments, and had no relation whatever to retrospective legislation of any other description." 4
This doctrine of Calder v. Bull is so well settled as to have become
one of the commonplaces of American constitutional law.
Though the doctrine be well settled at present, it did not go
unchallenged at the time of its enunciation. Both jurists and commentators questioned its soundness during the early part of the
nineteenth century. Story, while accepting the ruling of the case,
does so largely upon the ground that it had been long settled as
correct law, and intimates that if the question were to be reopened
he would be willing to give a different interpretation serious con1 Constitution of the United States, art. I, sec. 9, clause 3; also sec. IO,
clause 1.
2 3 Dallas 386 (1798)'.
3 Cf. COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Ed. 3), p. 3I2; KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON A:r.rERICAN LAW (Ed. I2, Holmes), vol. 1, p. 409; McCLAIN,
CoNSTITUTIO:>rAL LAW IN THE FNITED STATES (1905), p. gS; WILLOUGHBY,
ON THE CONSTITUTION, vol. 2, p. 8o3; HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, p. 93;
WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS HISTORY, APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION (1910), vol. I, p. 739; Br.ACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, p. 709; MII.LER LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION
oF THE UNITED STATES (r8gI), p. 586. These writers vary somewhat as to
the degree of positiveness with which they set forth this doctrine, some
merely stating that the case is a leading one and that its doctrine is
the law; others assert that the case is the correct exposition of the Constitution.
4 CooI.EY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (Ed. 7), p. 373.
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sideration.5 Justice William Johns0n of the Supreme Court severely
cl.'iticised the decision of Calder v. Bull.6 Professor Corwin, writing
of Fletcher v. Peck in "John Marshall and the Constitution," portrays Marshall as disapproving of the ruling of the court in the
C~lder case.1
The issue involved in the case of Calder v. Bull was whether an
act of the Connecticut legislature which set aside a decree of a
probate court was ex post facto or not. · In other words, did civil
cases come within the prohibition restraining the states from passing
any ex post facto law? While each of the justices sitting in the
case filed an opinion, that of Justice Chase is generally accepted
as the definitive exposition of ex post facto laws. He based his
opinion upon the usage of the term ex post facto in the state constitutions, its usage at common law, its position in the text of the
Constitution of the United States, and the intent of the framers
of the Constitution.
Of the justices who sat in the case, only one was a member of
the convention which framed the Constitution.8 For this reason
it is not possible to accept the assertion of Justice Chase, without
5 STORY, CoMMENTARttS ON THE CONSTITUTION (Ed. 5, Bigelow), vol. 2,
p. 2I9. Concerning the argument that ex post facto laws should be interpreted to mean laws affecting civil as well as criminal cases, Story says:
"As an original question, the argument would be entitled to grave consideration. * * *"
6 See his opinion in Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters 4r4, and also
Appendix, note r, p. 681. Of this exposition of the meaning of the term
as used in the Constitution, Story wrote: "The terms, ex post facto laws,
·in a comprehensive sense, embrace all retrospective laws, or laws governing
or controlling past transactions, whether they are of a civil or a criminal
nature. And there have not been wanting learned minds that have contended,
with no small force of authority and reasoning, that such ought to be the
interpretation of the terms in the Constitution of the United States." In a
note, Story refers directly to Johnson's opinion. STORY, COMMENTARIES
(Ed. 5), vol. 2, p. 2I9, and note I.
7 CORWIN, ]OHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION, p. 154: "However,
Marshall apparently fails to find entire satisfaction in this argument, for he
next turns to the prohibition against bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws with a question which manifests disapproval of the decision in Calder
v. Bull. Yet he hesitates to overrule Calder v. Bull, and indeed, even at the
very end of his opinion, he still declines to indicate clearly the basis of his
decision."
s ] ustice ·Patterson.
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confirmation from the records of the Federal convention itself,
when he says: "All the restrictions contained in the Constitution
of the United States on the power of the State legislatures were
provided in favor of the authority of the Federal government.. The
prohibition against their making any ex post facto laws was introduced for greater caution, and very probably arose from the knowledge that the Parliament of Great Britain claimed and exercised a
power to pass such laws under the denomination of bills of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties; the first inflicting capital, and
the other less, punishment. * * * To prevent such, and similar, acts
of violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State Legislatures
were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder, or ex post facto
law." 9 We may also be allowed to test his statement that the term
ex post facto was used in a technical sense in the Constitution, by
whatever evidence is available. Did the framers of the Constitution use the term ex post facto in a technical sense, did the people
who were members of the state conventions which ratified the Constitution understand it to be used in a technical sense, and what
was the general meaning attributed to the term by common usage
at that time? The answer to __these questions if affirmative, would
give historical support to the position taken by Justice Chase. If
the answers be negative, they would seem to weaken his position
considerably. The purpose of this study is to determine, if possible, what was included in the term ex post facto when it was
placed in the Constitution of the United States. On account of the
meagerness of the information which we have concerning the debates
in both the federal convention and the state ratifying conventions,
it is almost impossible to give an unqualified answer to these
questions.
_
The ex post facto clauses were late in being incorporated into
the Constitution. The first attempt to place a prohibition upon
Congress with respect to the passage of ex post facto laws occurred
in the session of Wednesday, August 22, when Madison reports
that "Mr. Gerry & Mr. McHenry moved to insert after the 2d. sect.
Art: 7, the Clause following, to wit, The Legislature shall pass no
bill of attainder nor any ex post facto law."10 Gerry spoke in favor
u 3 Dallas 389.
10 HuN'.l', GAir.t.ARD, AND

Scon, ]A"H~

BROWN, YADISON's Di:iiA'l'tS (Inter-
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of the motion, expressing the opinion that there was more need for
such a prohibition on the national legislature than on the state legislatures. Gouverneur Morris opposed that portion of the motion
dealing with ex post facto laws, but favored that portion forbidding
bills of attainder. Ellsworth and !Wilson both thought it unnecessary to prohibit ex post.facto laws, the latter thinking that it would
reflect ignorance of the "first principles of legislation." There
seemed to be agreement as to the desirability of prohibiting Congress from passing bills of attainder, and this portion of the motion
was agreed to. The second part of the motion was then taken up.
Carroll observed that legislatures had passed ex post facto laws
and they had taken effect, regardless of the views of th~ people.
Wilson opposed any prohibition on Congress in this matter, saying
that if they had proven to be of no use in the state constitutions
they would be of no use in the Federal Constitution, and that "both
sides will agree as to the principle, but will differ as to its application." Williamson called attention to the fact that such a prohibition existed in the constitution of North Carolina, and that while
it had been disregarded it had nevertheless served as a guide to
the judges. But Doctor Johnson thought the clause unnecessary
"and implying improper suspicion of the National Legislature."
Rutledge favored the clause. The vote on the latter portion of the
motion resulted in its passage.11 There is nothing in Madison's
record which gives any light on whether the term was used in a
technical sense or not.
The next mention ·made of the term in Madison's debates is in
connection with a prohibition on the states. "Mr. King moved to
add, in the words used in the Ordinance of Congs. establishing new
. States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts."12
national ed.), p. 449. It will be noted that bills of attainder and' e~ post
facto laws were to be placed in another connection in the next report of
the Committee of Detail. The discussion at this point was in connection
with Article VII, section 2, as reported by the Committee of Detail, August
6. See above, p. 341.
11 HuNT & Scott, op. cit., p. 450. The vote by states is given by Madison
as follows: uN. H. ay. Mas. ay. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Md. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay." Connecticut, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania voted against the prohibition.
12 Ibid., p. 478. Session of Tuesday, August 28.
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But Gouverneur Morris thought that this was going too far. His
opinion was that "within a state itself a majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief done among themselves." Sherman then
asked, "Why then prohibit bills of credit?" Col. Mason also seemed
to think that the prohibition was extreme, for he believed that there
were cases where a state must make provisions and it was not
proper to tie the hands of the state in the matter. Wilson answered
that "retrospective interferences only are to be prohibited." At this
point Madison asked a very significant question, "Is not that already
done by the prohibition of ex post facto laws, which will oblige the
Judges to declare such interferences null & void?" Mr. Rutledge
moved instead of Mr. King's motion to insert, "nor pass bills af
attainder nor retrospective laws," on which motion the vote was
seven to three in favor of the motion.13
From the conversation which Madison reports a number of significant facts are to be learned. One of the most striking things
in this connection is Madison's question. He is evidently of the
impression that ex post facto applies to civil as well as to criminal
matters. It is odd that no member of the Convention -took the
trouble to inform him that he was laboring under a serious misapprehension. It is hardly credible that such a slip should be permitted without some member calling it to his attention. Madison
does not record any answer given to his query.
Another fact of interest is the connection in which the matter
arose. The conversation evidently began over a proposed prohibition on the states regarding contracts. Contracts are a severely
civil matter. Rutledge's motion was a substitute for the motion
offered by King. Shortly ·before this took place Sherman had
expressed his opinion t~at this was "a favorable crisis for crushing
paper money."14 The whole setting _of the debate was civil in
character.
For the purpose of this study the wording of the substitute motion
which was offered by Rutledge is very important. This was the
motion which was adopted. It read, as reported by Madison, "nor
pass bills of attainder nor retrospective15 laws." In a note Madison
& SCOTT, op. cit., 479.
Ibid., 478.
1G Ibid., 479.
(Italics are mine.)

1a HUNT
14
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calls attention to t~e fact that the printed Journal contains the
words "ex post facto" instead of retrospective. 16 FARRAND'S edition
of the RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION . OF 1787 gives the
same note by Madison, but in an additional note gives the following: "The Journal is correct, according to marginal notes in the
Washington and Bready copies of the report of the Committee of
Detail."17 For the purPose of this study it is not decisive which of
these may be correct. It is evident that the two terms, ex post facto
and retrospective, were used synonymously. . It is improbable that
Madison alone understood the terms to have the meaning he
attaches to them. It is hard to escape the conclusion that in this
connection at least the members of the convention did not have in
mind the technical meaning of ex post facto laws. During the
entire debate recorded in this connection there is a notable absence
of anything pertaining to criminal affairs.
The following day, August 29, Mr. Dickinson "mentioned to the
House that on examining BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, he found
that the terms 'ex post facto' related to criminal cases only; that
they would not consequently restrain the States from retrospective
laws in civil cases, and that some further provision for this purpose
would be requisite." 18 The speaker injected this as a sort of an
observation; it had no bearing on what was before the Convention ·
at the time. He had evidently made it a point to look up his BLACKSTONE on the subject. It must be remembered that Dickinson was
a lawyer of repute. He probably had been in doubt concerning the
proceedings on the previous day and had gone to BLACKSTONE to
settle the matter. He could hardly have been certain of the meaning of the term the day before, else he would have brought it to the
attention of the Convention, for he did not hesitate to do so when
he had satisfied himself as t~ BLACKSTONE'S definition of it. Again,
he must have thought that there were others in the Convention who
were either in doubt or ignorance, for he advised that some further
16

HUNT & Scott, op. cit., p. 479, note (*) at bottom of page.

17

FARRAND, RscoRDS oF '.!:'HE FEDERAL Co~NTION oF 1787, vol.

2, p.
note 19. In answer to an inquiry from the writer, Mr. Gaillard Hunt,
of the editors of MADISON'S DEBATES cited above, gave his opinion on
note. He said, "I think they were used in the same signification in
note,'' in speaking of retrospective and e~ post facto.
18 HuNT & Sc<>TT, op. cit., p. 483.

440,
one
this
this
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provision should be made. He must also have felt that many of
the members believed that they had restrained the states in civil
as well as criminal matters by placing a prohibition upon them in
the passage of ex post facto laws. Othenvise his admonition would
have been unnecessary. One must conclude that his colleagues
needed enlightenment. Dickinson was a man of great wealth.20
Late in the Convention, Friday, September 14, Col. Mason moved
to strike out from the clause (art. I, sec. 9), "no bill of attainder
nor any ex facto law." He thought it; not sufficiently clear that the
prohibition meant by this phrase was limited to cases of a criminal
nature, "and no Legislature ever did or can altogether avoid them
in Civil cases." Gerry seconded the motion, but with a view "to
e::>..i:end the prohibition to 'Civil cases'; which he thought ought to
be done." 21
Here we get a glimpse of what may have been in Gerry's mind
when he moved for a similar prohibition on the Congress of the
United States. He seemed to think that they should comprehend
civil as well as criminal cases. Othenvise, why extend the meaning
in the prohibition on states? Mason must have felt that the Convention did not make it plain enough that they meant only criminal
cases. Mason's motion was to limit the meaning of the clause to
criminal cases and the Convention refused to do so. His motion
was defeated. Mason enumerated this as one of the reasons for
his opposition to the Constitution.22
In summing up the evidence as it appears in the debates in the
Federal Convention, it seems as though it can be said with accuracy
that the framers of the Constitution did not give evidence of using
the term e:r post facto in a technical sense. The tendency seemed
to be to impart a civil meaning to the term; there is no evidence of
the term being used in a different connection. It is constantly
referred to in speaking of civil affairs, as contracts or paper money.
It is also noticeable that there is not a single mention of the practice
of the British Parliament to which Justice Chase referred in his
opinion in Calder v. Bull. It is possible that this may have been a
factor in causing the framers to insert the ex post facto provision
BEARD, op. cit., p. 87.
& Scon, op. cit., p. 565.
22 FARRAND, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 636.
20

21 HUNT

• 322
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in the Constitution, but it is not discernible in the debates on the
point. Evidently, very different factors prompted them to insert
the words in the Constitution. It is more than probable, judged by
the debates themselves, that these men thought more of. contracts
and paper money in this connection than any lessons which might
be learned from British parliamentary practice. They had experienced bills of attainder and ez post facto laws in the colonies
themselves, and had little need to reach across the water for in~truc
tion in this matter. The fact that these men did think of safeguarding the paper money of that day, and their contracts, is not
derogatory in the least. It may or may not have been caused by
self-interest. But a sufficient explanation can be found in the ideas
prevalent in the eighteenth century. Protections such as these were
considered as essential to liberty as the personal liberty of citizens.
Property protection was as vital as personal protection. Then, too,
it cannot be denied that there were many at that time who J;ield large
sums of paper money and who feared that action on the part of
state legislatures would injure the value of this money. This appears
in the conventions held in the various states for the purpose of
ratifying the Constitution, and has been hinted at in studies which
have been made of the ·Constitution.
A study of the available records of the state ratifying conventions is informative. This information is not important because of
its amount but rather from its character. Many of the delegates
to the convention which framed the Constitution were also delegates to the state conventions which ratified the Constitution. In
the Virginia convention such men as Marshall, Madison, Henry,
Mason and Randolph were delegates. Some of these had also
taken part in framing the Constitution. The opposition to the Constitution was quite bitter in the Virginia convention, and the opposition leaders, Henry and Mason, made many long speeches against
the adoption of the instrument. The debates for the Virginia convention are quite well reported and a number of speeches are given
on the ez post facto clauses in the Constitution.
Henry refused to be convinced that there was no need of a bill
of rights in the Constitution because of the prohibitions on the Congress contained in the ninth section of article one. He brushed
aside this contention by saying that these guarantees were so "feeble
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and few, that it would have been infinitely better to have said
nothing about it." But it was when he came to the subject of paper
money that Patrick Henry became eloquent. He was very much
afraid that the Northern states would force Virginia to help pay
for paper money which when acquired was nearly worthless, but
which the holders expected to redeem at a goodly rate as soon as
the new government had been instituted. In this connection he
came upon the e% post facto provision. He said: "If ex post facto
laws had not been interdicted, they might also have been extended
by implication at pleasure. Let us consider whether this restriction
is founded in wisdom or good policy. If no ex post facto laws be
made, what is to become of the old Continental paper dollars? Will
not this country be forced to pay in gold and silver, shilling for
shilling?"23 Henry evidently considered e% post facto laws as being
able to disturb civil matters, as, for example, currency. Henry was
a lawyer and should have been acquainted with the meaning of the
term, and if it were used in a technic~l sense should have restricted
the use of the word to such a meaning. As a matter of fact, Henry
was attacked by Randolph for failing to use the term in its technical sense. Randolph pointed out that e% post facto laws had reference only to criminal cases.24 \While it may not have any bearing
on the matter, it might be mentioned here that Randolph held $r6,ooo
of this paper money of which Mason and Henry were so afraid.25
This may or may not have been a factor in the controversy. Henry
was not convinced by Randolph's remarks, for when the debate
proceeded to the next article, where the prohibition is on the states,
he reiterated his fears that the state of Virginia would have to pay
her share of the Continental money. He called attention to the
rumor that the Northern states had acquired much of that money
and would hold it at its nominal value. 26
George Mason also spoke of e% posi.t facto laws in connection with
paper money. He held very little of this money. 27 Mason main23 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 471. Henry's speeches were sometimes quite long
and were always sarcastic.
24 3 ELLIOT, 461.
25 B£ARD, op. cit., p. 139.
26 3 ELLIOT 471.
21 B£ARD, op. cit., 128.
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tained that laws passed to relieve the threatening hardship on the
states which held little of this paper money would be declared to be
ex post facto. 28 Madison, in making some answers to these objections, did not call attention to the fact that such laws were only
declared ex post facto when they were in the nature of punishments
for criminal offenses. He could not have been aware that such
was their meaning. However, this was a poorly reported speech,
as the latter portion of it was so low that it was not audible to many
members of the convention.29
George Nicholas, in speaking against Henry, denied that the
legislature of Virginia had any right to make a law which interfered
with the Continental debts, saying: "Have they a right to make
ex post facto laws?" He answered his own question with an
emphatic "No, sir!" Nicholas also couples this with the right to
make laws impairing the obligation of contracts, which he also
denies to the states. His opinion was that the states never could
exercise these powers, for, "such general objects being vested in
Congress,'' they are excluded from any power over them. In closing,
he observed that the holders of paper money would have to make
application to Congress for regulation and discharge of this currency. He met Henry upon the latter's ground, as though there
was nothing wrong in using ex post facto in connection with the
subject of paper money.
Randolph again took the floor and asserted that if any proof were
needed as to the true meaning of the term that proof was to be
found in their position in the text of the Constitution, placed as
they ai:.e in connection with the. bills of attainder. He insisted that
the words had a technical meaning and they were so used in
the Federal Convention.31 At this Mason launched forth into a
harangue on the question of technical versus non-technical use of
the words. Mas<?n argued that whatever the technical meaning
might be it was commonly understood that the terms meant exactly
what the words literally imported, a!).d that unless some express
provision were made to the contrary it would be necessary for
people to consider such to be the case, and it would devolve upon
28

3 ELLIOl' 472.

29

Ibid., p. 473.

31 3

ELLIOl' 477.
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the F.ederal judges to give them that construction. He asked: "Are
we to trust business of this sort to technical definition ?"32
It is interesting to note that in the debates in the Virginia convention Randolph alone maintained that the words were limited to
a criminal import. Mason, Henry, Nicholas and Madison treated
and used the terms as though they comprehended civil and criminal
matters. In fact, the reported debates give no evidence of their
using the term ex post facto in connection with a criminal case.
It does not appear in the record that Marshall took any part in the
debate at this point.
The only other state convention of which any debates on this
question are recorded is that of North Carolina. It can hardly be
an accident that the discussion which took place in the North Carolina convention, like that in the Virginia convention, centered around
the subject of paper money. In reading the North Carolina records
one notes the lack of any reference to a criminal connotation of
the term ex post facto. There are some direct references to civil
matters.
Mr. Cabarrus, speaking on the subject of bills of credit, held that
the prohibition on the states emitting bills of credit would not affect
paper money. His theory was that the Constitution was an instrument for the future government of the United States, and not for
the past. Furthermore, "this Constitution declares, in the most positive terms, that no ex post facto law shall be passed by the general
government. Were this clause to operate retrospectively, it would
clearly be ex post facto, and repugnant to the express provision of
the Constitution. How, then, in the name of God, can the Constitution take our paper money away ?"33 Here is another case of a
use of the term ex post facto as synonymous with retrospective.
It is another case of linking ex post facto laws with the subject of
paper money.
But Mr. Bloodworth took a different view. This gentleman
wished to know if the "payment of sums now due be ex post facto." 34
He did not differ from the preceding speaker in the use of the
phrase, as far as content and meaning is concerned.
32
33

Ibid., 479.
4 Er;r,10T 184

34

Ibid., 184.
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Perhaps the most interesting comment to be found in any of the
reports on the clauses in point, in the state convention records, is
that of Iredell, who was a member of the North Carolina convention. Iredell was later to sit on the bench with Justice Chase in the
case of Calder v. Bull, concurring with the latter justice in his opinion. In the Carolina convention he spoke just after Mr: Bloodworth.
His words were as follows : "Mr. Chairman, with respect to this
clause, it cannot have the meaning contended for. There is nothing
in the Constitution which affects our pr~sent 'paper money. It prohibits, for the fuhtre, the emitting of any, but it does not interfere
with the paper money now actually in circulation in several states.
There is an express clause which protects it. It provides that there
shall be no ex post facto law. This would be ex post facto, if the
construction contended for were right, as has been observed by
another gentleman."35 To compare this statement with his opinion
in the case of Calder v. Bull is interesting. · In that case he said:
"Still, however, in the present instance, the act or resolution of the
legislature of Connecticut cannot be regarded as an ex post facto
law; for the true construction of the prohibition extends to criminal, not to civil, cases. It is only in criminal cases, indeed, in
which the danger to be guarded against is greatly to be apprehended."36 One might wonder why Iredell did not call this to the
attention of his convention colleagues a decade earlier. He may
have held the opinion of another justice who sat upon the same
bench a little over a century later, that what a person may think
subjectively, as a person or legislator, may not be what he must
think when a judge, considering the problem objectively. What
he may think constitutional as a legislator may be looked upon by
the same man as unconstitutional when he is a judge.37 Another
explanation is possible, a very simple one, namely, that Iredell had
learned more of law in the intervening years.
The record of one other state convention throws some light upon
this problem. There is a reference to it in the New York convention records, though there appears to have been no debate upon the
'

85 4 ELLIOT

.

185. (Italics by the writer.)
3 Dallas 399.
3 1 See comment on Justice White in article by Professor Robert E. Cushman, 4 MINN. L. REv. 275.
86
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point in that convention. When the convention came to consider
sections, 8, 9, and ro, these sections of article I were read by the
secretary, and amendments were moved to them, without any debate.
The r~cord shows that Mr. Lansing moved, "Respecting ex post
facto laws; Provided, that the meaning of ex post facto laws shall
not be construed to prevent calling public defaulters to account, but
shall e,.'{tend only to crimes."38 Mr. Lansing was a lawyer, though
not a brilliant one.39 He must have felt that there was some danger
of a civil meaning being given to the words. His amendment was
one of those submitted to Congress by the New York convention.40
It will be seen, therefore, that a study of the records of the state
conventions strengthens the conclusion arrived at following the
study of the convention which framed the Constitution. One can
hardly feel that the term ex post facto was intended to be limited
to criminal cases when it was embodied in the text of the Constitution. Several of the men who use the phrase as though it comprehended civil as well as criminal matters were lawyers. The only
evidence which indicates that the words were used in a technical
sense is that of Randolph in the Virginia convention. On the other
hand, nearly every other speaker can be cited as indicating a nontechnical usage. The connection in which the term was used is of
significance, and it has been mentioned that it was used almost
exclusively, in the conventions, with regard to civil matters. Such
evidence as is available as to the intent of the framers of the Constitution, therefore, would tend to contradict the position taken by
Justice Chase.
But Justice Chase also refers to the FEDERALIST, and pays the
author, presumably Hamilton, a high tribute. While the FEDERALIST is not as authoritative as the records of the conventions, still it
is generally recognized as carrying great weight as a commentary
on the Constitution. There are two numbers of the FEDERALIST
which contain comments on ex post facto laws. One is by Hamilton, the other is by Madison. It is natural that Hamilton should
consider ex post facto laws as relating to criminal cases, if BLACKSTONE was understood to support this view, for Hamilton relies on
38 2

ELLIOT 407.
BEARD, op. cit., p. 123.
40 FEDERALIST (Ford ed.), p. 641.
39
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BLACKSTONE as his authority. 41 It is therefore necessary to examine BLACKSTONE's comment on this point. After a study of the
passage in BLACKSTONE it does not appear that he is an authority
strictly in point. The words of Justice Johnson on this passage
seem to analyze it accurately. After refuting the argument of Jµstice Chase that Woodeson supported his view, Johnson says: "Judge
Blackstone is by no means conclusive, if any authority at all upon
the subject. .ARCH. & CHRIST. BLACK. 4r, OLD EDIT. 46. He is
commenting upon the definition of a law generally; and that member of the definition which designates it as 'a rule prescribed.' And
when illustrating the nature and necessity of this attribute of a law,
he illustrates it by referring to the laws of Caligula, written in
small characters, and hung up out of view, to ensnare the people;
and then remarks, 'There is still a more unreasonable method than
this, which is called making of laws ex post facto; where, after an
action, indifferent in itself, has been committed, the legislator then
for the first time, declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a
punishment upon the person who has committed it.'
"This is precisely what Woodeson calls a penal statute, passed
ex post facto; but it by no means follows, that because a penal
statute may be ex post facto, that none other can be affected with
that character; and certainly his commentator, Mr. Christian, in
, his note upon the phrase 'ex post facto,' seems to have had no idea
of this restrictive application of it. His words are: 'an ex post
facto law may be either of a public or a private nature; and when
we speak generally of an ex post facto law, we perhaps, always,
mean a law which comprehends the whole community. The Roman
privilegia seem to correspond to our bills of attainder, and bills of
pains and penalties, which, though in their nature they are ex post
facto laws, yet are seldom called so.' Here he speaks of a law, not
of a penal law, which comprehends the whole community; and of
certain penal laws, in their nature ex post facto; that is, of the
description of ex post facto laws; which they certainly are, without
being exclusively so.'' 42
Madison is supposed to be the author of the other number of the
41

FEDERALIST (Ford ed.), p. 571. Hamilton quotes directly from Black-

stone.
42 2

Peters 684.
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FEDERALIS.T which bears on this question. But Madison does not
give an explicit definition of the term. It is not clear that he confines the meaning of the term to criminal matters.43 Madison seems
to have consistently held to the view that ex post facto laws had a
broader meaning than a technical use would suggest. This appears
from his words in the Federal Convention, in the Virginia convention, and in the FEDERAI,IST.
Justice Johnson's opinion on the other portions of the decision
in Calder v. Bull are also interesting. It might be noted here that
Johnson had the advantage over Chase of having access to the
printed Joumal of the Federal Convention, which was not acces·
sible to Chase.44 This opinion of Justice Johnson is found in a note
appended to Satterlee v. Matthewson. 45 The Justice thought that
the decision in the Calder case caused much trouble in later years,
for he said in Satterlee v. Matthewson: "The whole of this difficulty arises out of that unhappy idea, that the phrase 'ex post facto,'
in the Constitution of the United States, was confined to criminal
cases exclusively; a decision which leaves a large class of arbitrary
legislative acts without the prohibitions of the Constitution.''46 He
then adds that he is subjoining a note which embodies the results
of his investigation in the subject.
In this note Johnson takes up, point by point, the argument of
Justice Chase. Among other things, he denies to the case of Calder
v. Bull the force of an adjudication in point. He maintains that it
was not necessary to the disposition of the case that a decision be
made on e.x post facto laws.47 Justice Johnson also believed that
43

F!lDllRALlS'l',

p. 295.
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The Journal was first published in 1819.
45 2 Peters 38o. Appendix I, p. 68x.
46 2 Peters 416.
i7 Ibid., p. 682. After examining in some detail the arguments of each
of the justices in Calder v. Bull, Johnson says: "Thus it appears that all
the judges who sat in the case of Calder v. Bull concurred' in the opinion,
that the decision of the court of probate, and the lapse of the time given
for an appeal to their court of errors, were not final upon the rights of the
parties; that there still existed in the legislature a controlling and revising
power over the controversy; and that this was duly exercised in the reversal
of the first decree of the court of probate. And who can doubt that the
legislature of a state may be vested by the state constitution with such a
power when so delegated. *
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there was a mistaken view prevalent as to the roots and original
meaning of the term. 48 He also attacks the argument that the position of the phrase in the text of the Constitution is indicativ~ of
its technical meaning, being placed as it is right next to the provision
prohibiting bills of attainder. His contention in this matter may
not be more weighty than the contention to the contrary by the
judges in the Calder case, for it is a matter fraught with danger
of error to depend upon such textual criticism as is involved in
this case. But of the two arguments, that of Justice Johnson probably would appeal as the more reasonable. He said: "For by
placing 'ex post facto' laws between bills of attainder, which are
exclusively criminal, and laws violating the obligation of contracts,
which are exclusively civil, it would rather seem that e:c post facto
laws partook of both characters, was common to both purposes." 40
As to the use of the term in the state constitutions, Johnson holds
that their use was not such as to support the view taken by Justice
Chase. He even shows that there is ground for believing that Chase
himself was instrumental in restricting its use so as to be limited
to criminal cases.50 The above are among the more important observations to be found in this note by Justice Johnson, whom Story
"How then could the question whether the phrase 'ex post facto" was
confined to criminal laws arise in this cause? the law complained of was
equally free from that characteristic; though the phrase be held to extend
to laws of a civil character. I have then a right to deny that the construction intimated by three of the judges, in the case of Calder v. Bull, is entitled
to the weight of an adjudication."
48 Ibid., 683.
40 Ibid., 687.
50 Ibid., 685.
"Some of the state constitutions are also referrtd to, as
furnishing aIJi exposition of the words ex post facto, which confine its application to criminal cases. But of the four that have been cited, it will be found
that those of Massachusetts and Delaware do not contain the phrase; and,
as if sensible of the general application of its meaning to all laws, giving
effects and consequences. to past actions, which were not attached to them
when they occurred, simply give a description of the laws they mean to
prohibit, without resorting to the aid of a quaint phrase which can only be
explained· by an extended periphrasis." See also ioid., 686: "Maryland first
used it in this restricted sense, and North Carolina copied from Maryland;
and if the evidence of contemporariesi may be relied on, Mr. Chase was one
of the committee who reported the Constitution of Maryland; and thus
stands the authority for the restricted . use."
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called "learned." The fact that this opinion 'Yas expressed so late,
1829, may account for the little heed which was paid to it. The law
had been settled.
A study of some of the correspondence of the prominent men
in law and politics of that day, though not exhaustive, does not
reveal any new information upon the problem of ez post facto
laws and their meaning in the Constitution. There is, however, a
very significant letter written to the governor of Connecticut, transmitting a copy of the Constitution as framed by the Convention of
1787, to be presented to the state convention for consideration.
The writers were Sherman and Ellsworth. The latter was to
become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in a short while. On
that account this letter is of interest. The portion of the letter in
point is as follows : "The restraint on the legislatures of the several states respecting emitting bills of credit, making anything but
money a tender in payment of debts, or impairing the obligation
of contracts by ez post facto laws, was thought necessary as a
security to commerce, in which the interest of foreigners, as well
as of the citizens of the different states, may be affected." 51 This
is a very direct statement which would seem to be of weight.
.Even at this fate day a writer of high scholastic standing has
written: "Until 1798, the provision generally regarded as offering
the most promising weapon against special legislation was the ex
post facto clause." 52 It would seem as though there have been reputable authorities, both past and present, who incline to the view
that the ez post facto provisions of the Constitution prohibited
civil as well as criminal legislation, when judged by the intention
of the framers of the Constitution and by the understanding of the
people of that day.
St. Paul, Minn.
Or,~R P. Fu~r,n.
51
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